The Responsiveness of Demand Policies to Balance of Payments: Postwar Patterns by Michael Michaely
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Responsiveness of Demand Policies to Balance of Payments:
Postwar Patterns






Chapter Author: Michael Michaely
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3438
Chapter pages in book: (p. 76 - 94)CHAPTER 4 BELGIUM
1. Policy Instruments
MONETARY POLICY
The management of monetary policy in Belgium is formally more
decentralized than in most other countries. Three separate institutions
are in charge of the three "classical" monetary instruments. The Na-
tional Bank of Belgium, the central bank, is responsible for setting the
discount rates and for discounting bills and granting advances to com-
mercial banks, although the discounting is done partly through a
separate, intennediary institution. Open market operations are con-
ducted by an autonomous institution, the Fonds des Rentes, and
minimum reserve ratios are under the jurisdiction of still another
agency, the Banking Commission. The latter two organizations are,
however, heavily influenced by the National Bank and, as will be seen
shortly, the areas in their charge are of a subsidiary nature in the con-
duct of over-all monetary policy. However, because of various checks
limiting its operations, the Bank in turn cannot deviate materially from
the policy of the government, particularly the Ministry of Finance.
The Discount Rate. The discount rate is by far the most important
instrument in the conduct of monetary policy in Belgium. The basic
discount rate applies to the discounting of most domestic bills. Other
rates—some lower (for bills originating in foreign trade) and some
higher—apply to the discounting of other bills and to advances made
by the National Bank. As a rule, the whole schedule of rates is changed
at once, with constant spreads maintained between the various rates,
so that the position of the basic discount rate is representative of the
whole rate schedule.
The discount rate is significant in more than one way. First, it affects
the cost of borrowing from the central bank: National Bank lending toBELGIUM 77
commercial banks, by rediscounting or by advances, is substantial and
is subject to large variations. Second, and even more important, the
schedule of rates charged by commercial banks on their lending (or
paid to their depositors) changes almost automatically with changes
in the discount rate; this relationship was particularly rigid until 1961.
Lastly, as in many other countries, changes in the discount rate are
taken as a signal of restrictive or expansionary intentions of the mone-
tary authorities.
Open-Market Operations. These operations are not, as a rule, in-
tended to affect over-all monetary conditions. The function of the
Fonds des Rentes, the agency in charge of the operations, is primarily
to regulate the market for government securities. Its dealings in that
market are intended to prevent undue fluctuations and to lead to the
conformity of movements of long-term rates with those of the discount
rate, rather than to have an independent effect on interest rates. Since
1957, the Fonds has also been heavily engaged in transactions in its
own certificates. But, again, these operations are intended to smooth
movements in the money market rather than to change basic monetary
circumstances. Open-market operations are thus not a relevant variable
for the purpose of this study.
Minimum Liquidity Ratios. The Banking Commission supervises a
wide schedule of liquidity ratios, starting from a "cash ratio" of 4 per.
cent and ending with a "cover ratio" of, at the extreme, 65 per cent.
But this schedule has remained unchanged throughout the period, ex-
cept for the abolition of the cover ratio at the end of 1962. It is
intended to secure bank solvency and banks' holdings of government
securities rather than to affect their lending capacity. In recent years,
a system of minimum reserve ratios was introduced. In principle, this
system is flexible and is intended to affect .banks' lending capacity;
however, its actual operation began only in 1963, so it is practically
immaterial for purposes of the present study.
Other potential instruments are of even less importance. Quantitative
control of credit existed for a short time—from early 1964 to mid- 1965
and during most of 1966. The National Bank sets maximum quotas for
its lending to each bank, but these quotas are rarely reached, and are
thus ineffective. Among the direct instruments available for monetary
policy, the discount rate is thus by far the most important, and is in
practice the only instrument generally relied upon to effect monetary
changes.78 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
BUDGETARY AND DEBT POLICY
The Belgian government's budget consists of two parts, one for ordi-
nary, and one for extraordinary, items although the criteria of division
between the two parts are not clear and are subject to frequent changes.
The extraordinary budget includes primarily investment expenditures,
either made directly by government or through lending for the
purpose of capital outlays. Extraordinary expenditures are financed
overwhelmingly by borrowing, so that the size of the deficit in the
extraordinary budget approaches the size of the budget itself. But the
ordinary budget too shows deficits more often than surpluses. The net
result has thus been a practically uninterrupted deficit of substantial
proportions in the over-all budget. The deficit is financed by borrowing
from all sources: the central bank, commercial banks, the capital market
and foreign lenders.
As a source of long-term lending, the National Bank is of only minor
significance. By an agreement dating from 1948, total outstanding
lending from the Bank to the Treasury cannot exceed 44 billion francs,
of which 34 billion is a consolidated loan originating in the war years,
while the remainder is a revolving fund.' Over the period as a whole,
the outstanding amount of Treasury indebtedness to the Bank has been
quite stable, although for some short periods its fluctuations are sub-
stantial. The outstanding amount of Treasury deposits in the Bank, and
fluctuations in this amount, are insignificant in relation to the size of
the debt; movements of the government's net indebtedness to the Bank
are thus practically identical with those of the gross indebtedness.
The size of commercial banks' lending to the government was partly
dictated, until 1962, by the "cover" regulations, which require the
banks to hold liquid assets primarily in the form of Treasury Certffi-
cates. This lending, together with the acquisition of government securi-
ties in the capital market, are the main source for financing the large
budgetary deficit. As will be recalled, the Fonds des Rentes seeks to
regulate the sale of government securities so as not to disrupt existing
market conditions. An excess of supply of these securities, at current
market rates, is directed primarily to the National Bank; while an
excess of demand is met by sales from the Bank's portfolio. Net
changes in the Bank's lending to the government are thus determined
1Therevolving fund has recently been increased to 16 billion francs.BELGIUM 79
as the difference between the government's deficit and the amount of
financing obtained from other sources at existing market rates.
2. Statistical Analysis
For purposes of this analysis, turning points in Belgium's balance-of-
payments position have been determined by the movements of the
country's external reserves (shown in Chart 4-1) and, since 1958, by
the series of over-all surpluses or deficits (not shown); both series give
mostly similar indications.2 The subperiods of imbalances are identified
in Table 4-1, where the movement of external reserves (column 1)
indicates the direction of the imbalance.
In column 2 of the table, movements of the discount rate during
subperiods of imbalances are described. It is immediately apparent
that until the end of 1961, movements of the discount rate generally
conformed to what would be expected had they been taken in response
to the balance-of-payments position. The only exception is the move-
ment of the discount rate during ii 1952 —ii1953, when the rate was
lowered at a period of a downward imbalance of payments; but, as a
glance at Chart 4-1 will show, the fall of reserves and the reduction of
the discount rate were very slight, so that the rule was not seriously
violated. From 1962 on, however, movements of the discount rate do
not seem to be generally related to the needs of the balance of pay-
ments.
The association of the discount rate with the balance of payments is
tested by means of Table 4-2, in which all changes of the discount rate
are recorded. In column 1, the trend of the country's external reserves
just before each change in the discount rate is shown.8 It is again im-
mediately clear that, up to the beginning of 1962, practically all
changes in the discount rate could be interpreted as responses in an
adjusting direction to the balance-of-payments position. The only
2Thesubperiod iv 1958—in 1960 is an exception: the over-all balance fluctu-
ates, showing only a slight cumulative deficit over the period, which is therefore
designated as a subperiod of stability, whereas the loss of external reserves over
this period is more substantial.
8Thisrefers to the direction of change of reserves during the last quarter be-
fore the change in the discount rate, but almost the same results are indicated
when the last two quarters are observed. This, applies also to indications of move-
ments of alternative target variables, discussed below.8o DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 4-1
BELGIUM: TIME SERIES OF SELECTED VARIABLES





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BELGIUM: CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE



















in 1950 + fall + falls + rises + rises
in 1955 * stable + falls + rises * stable
iv 1956 + fall + low —falls + rises
in 1957 + fall —rises —falls —falls
iv 1959 + fall —high + rises * stable
in 1960 + fall —high —falls —falls
in 1963 —rise + falls + rises —falls
iv 1963 —rise + falls + rises + rises
in 1964 * stable + low * stable + rises
ii 1966 * stable + low —falls + rises
Lowered:
in 1951 + rise * stable —rises * stable
iv 1952 —fall + rises + falls + falls
iv 1953 + rise + rises —rises * stable
i 1958 + rise + rises + falls + falls
ii 1958 + rise + rises + falls + falls
in 1958 + rise + rises + falls + falls
i 1959 + rise + rises + falls * stable
in 1961 + rise —falls —rises * stable
iv 1961 + rise * stable —rises * stable
i 1962 + rise —falls —rises * stable
in 1962 * stable —falls + falls * stable
iv 1962 * stable + rises —rises * stable
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Chapter 3, explanatory note.
exceptions, out of a rather large number of observations, are a small
reduction of the discount rate in December 1952 (which, as was noted
before, was taken while reserves were slightly falling), and a slight
increase of the rate in August 1955, which cannot be explained by the
movement of reserves, then practically stable. Once more, no such
association appears for the later years: starting with the lowering of the84 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
rate in August 1962, movement of the discount rate can no longer be
explained by the need for balance-of-payments adjustment.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 are designed to test the possibility that changes
in the discount rate before 1962, which we have tentatively regarded
as intended for balance-of-payments adjustment, could not in fact be
interpreted as having been taken in response to the needs of other tar-
gets. In column 2, the unemployment position is described. The evi-
dence of this column does not contradict the assumption that changes
in the discount rate were intended to achieve the target of high employ-
ment. This is true in particular with regard to discount rate reductions,
almost all of which were taken at a time of high and rising unemploy-
ment. It is less true when discount-rate increases are examined: some
of these were taken when unemployment was either rising or, though
falling, was high. Taking together movements of the discount rate in
both directions, the association between them and the employment situ-
ation would appear to be somewhat weaker than their association with
the balance of payments, but it is still rather strong. To only a slightly
smaller extent, this applies also to the target of high industrial produc-
tion, which is represented in column 3. Once more, it is in the cases
of reductions of the discount rate where the association of the instru-
ment with the target is strong, while increases of the discount rate do
not appear to be generally related to the state of industrial production.
On this evidence, changes in the discount rate are more weakly
associated with the targets of high employment and high production
than with the balance of payments. It is not, however, so weak an
association that it can be dismissed without further consideration of
the possibility that it was really these two targets, and not the balance
of payments, to which the discount rate responded. One further test
which may be attempted is to isolate those episodes of change in the
discount rate in which either the target of high employment or that of
high production, or both, would indicate a policy different from that
which the balance of payments would call for. We find a number of
episodes (July 1957, December 1959, and August 1960) in which the
discount rate was raised when reserves were falling,despite high
unemployment or slack production; and a number of other episodes
(July 1951, and a succession of changes from August 1961 to March
1962) in which a lowering of the discount rate could be explained by
the rise of foreign-exchange reserves but not by the requirements of
employment and production. Only in the episode of December 1952,BELGIUM 85
notedbefore, did the opposite occur: the rate was lowered while
reserves were falling slightly, as would be required by rising unemploy-
ment and falling production at that time. These episodes cover only a
minority of the movements of the discount rate; but, as far as they go,
they indicate that preference was generally given to balance-of-pay-
ments requirements.
A similar test may be conducted by means of a reference cycle
analysis, where the cycles are determined by moven:ients of the discount
rate: at the trough the discount rate is lowest; it rises towards the peak
of the cycle, when it is highest; and falls again towards the next trough.
The turning points of the discount rate cycles are as follows:
Cycle Trough Peak Trough
1950—54 i 1950 i 1951 in 1954
1954—59 ni 1954 iv 1957 ii 1959
1959—63 xi1959 iv 1960 i 1963
1963—66 i1963 iv1966 —
Chart4-2 describes this analysis. Parts A, B and C present, respec-
tively, the movements of external reserves, the unemployment ratio and
the rate of expansion of industrial production. The assumption that
discount rate changes were made in response to these respective targets
would require the patterns of movements, of reserves and of the unem-
ployment ratio to be V-shaped, while the industrial-production pattern
should either have the reverse shape or show a relatively high average
position during the trough-to-peak phases. In fact, no resemblance to
the expected shape is found in the industrial-production pattern; some
resemblance is apparent for the two other target variables during the
three cycles up to 1963, though it is not perfect in either one. In view
of these observations, the assumption that discount-rate changes were
responses to the balance-of-payments position fares quite well, but
again, alternative assumptions about the motivation of changes in the
discount rate could not be entirely dismissed.
A final test of the possibility that the discount rate was manipulated
in accordance with the needs of employment and production is made
using a reference cycle analysis in which the cycles are determined by
movements of these targets; this is done for the years 1950—60, in
which two cycles can be clearly distinguished. The turning points in the
cycles would be almost identical for both the unemployment ratio and
the index of industrial production. It was therefore decided to select
just one of those variables to represent both. Chart 4-3 thus presents86 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 4-2
BELGIUM: PATTERNS OF TARGET VARIABLES DURING
DISCOUNT-RATE CYCLES
A B
Goldand Reserves Unemployment Ratio
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ananalysis of cycles of industrial production, but it should also be
understood to represent, in effect, patterns relating to cycles of unem-
ployment. In the trough-to-peak phase of this cycle, the rate of expan-
sion of production is high, and unemployment is low, whereas during
the peak-to-trough phase the rate of expansion is low—sometimes
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Cycle Trough Peak Trough
1950—53 n1950 ii1951 ix1953
1953—58 ii1953 i1957 iv1958
Part A of Chart 4-3 describes the pattern of movements of the dis-
count rate along the two cycles. A conformity of these movements to
the needs of production and of employment would result in inverted
V-shaped patterns. Some resemblance to this pattern does appear for
the cycle of 1950—53; in the cycle of 1953—58, on the other hand, no
such pattern is revealed. Thus, the association of the discount rate with
III UtIV V VI VUVIIIIX88.DEMANDPOLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 4-3
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Change in Money SupplyBELGIUM 89
movements of the domestic targets of production and employment is
rather weak.4
From the combined evidence of these tests we cannot categorically
reject the possibility that discount rate policy was determined primarily
in relation to the domestic targets of employment and production, but
it seems more likely that, until 1962, the balance of payments was the
main consideration and was given preference in the event of conflict
with the requirements of employment and production. It must be em-
phasized, however, that such conflicts were rare and of minor signifi-
cance. Most of the time, both the domestic targets and. balance-of-
payments developments required the same direction of policy• action.
It remains to examine the possibility that, during the period up to
1962, discount rate changes were directed toward the target of price
stability. As column 4 in Table 4-2 shows, such a possibility cannot be
refuted altogether. Discount rate changes were often in the direction
indicated by the need to maintain price stability and rarely in the
opposite direction; but often also there seemed to be no association
between rate changes and price movements, and the discount rate was
raised or lowered while prices were stable. It should be noted that,
although the price level did fluctuate during the period under considera-
tion, the changes were not very large most of the time. Aside from a
large rise from mid-1950 to mid-1951 (the Korean War period) and
a considerable decline from then to mid-1953, the wholesale price level
remained almost stable until late 1962. One may assume that price
fluctuations could not have been a major reason for manipulations of
the discount rate during these years.
It seems more likely, on the other hand, that from early 1963 to the
end of 1966 it was, indeed, the movement of the price level to which
the discount rate responded. As has .been noted earlier, the discount
rate during this period does not appear to be related to the balance-of-
payments position. Over the period as a whole, it even moved in a
disadjusting direction: it was continuously raised while external reserves
were generally increasing, even though mildly. As can be seen from
Table 4-2, this tendency of the discount rate does not appear to be
associated with changes in the rate of expansion of production and
probably not with changes in unemployment. Price movements, how-
A direct comparison of the regularity of the pattern under consideration
with the pattern followed by the discount rate during cycles in the balance of
payments would have been helpful. It is unfortunate, for this purpose, that no
meaningful "cycles" of the latter can be found.a
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ever, provide an easy explanation: after many years of stability, prices
were rising continuously and substantially. It is plausible that during
this period of rising prices and rising external reserves—two phe-
nomena with conflicting requirements for policy direction—the target
of price stability assumed preference over the target of balance-of-
payments adjustment. The discount rate, the major direct instrument of
monetary policy in Belgium, then began to be used more for the pur-
pose of stabilizing prices than to achieve balance-of-payments equi-
librium.
As for some other monetary variables, column 3 in Table 4-1
describes the behavior of.the National Bank's lending to the commercial
banking system. This variable generally moved in a disadjusting direc-
tion, i.e., in a direction opposite to the movements of the country's.
external reserves. Until about the middle of 1962, this inverse relation-
ship was almost perfect, as may be seen from both column 3 and Chart
4-1. Since then, fluctuations in the amount of lending to the banks do
not seem to correspond to any fluctuations in the amount of external
reserves.
The amount of lending from the National Bank to the government
does not seem to have any relationship to the balance-of-payments
position. During nearly all of the subperiods of imbalance of payments,
lending to the government was either quite stable or fluctuating with no
general trend. While the outstanding amount of this lending was always
substantially higher than the amount of, National Bank lending to the
banks, fluctuations in the latter were usually greater than fluctuations
in the former. As a result, the direction of change in the National
Bank's total domestic assets, which are made up primarily of these two
categories, tended to be determined by the movements in its loans to
the commercial banks. Fr:m column 4 in Table 4-1, it also appears
that the total domestic assets pf the National Bank generally' moved in
a disadjusting direction, although not quite with the same consistency
as its lending to the banks.
The amount of commercial bank credit to the public, on the other
hand, certainly seemed to move in an adjusting direction. This may be
seen from column 5inTable 4-1, where the rate of expansion of credit
(positive throughout) is described. Without exception, this rate appears
to have responded in an adjusting manner to the balance-of-payments
position: it was higher. in times of surplus, and lower when deficits
appeared.
Practically identical conclusions may be derived for the rate ofBELGIUM 91
change of money supply (column 6 of Table 4-1). Once more, in
almost all subperiods of imbalances of payments, movements of this
variable appear to have been positively associated with movements of
external reserves, that is, to move in an adjusting direction.
It seems very unlikely that these movements of credit and money
supply were in fact intended to meet the needs of other major targets.
This may be seen from Parts B and C of Chart 4-3, where the move-
ments of the two variables during the cycles of industrial production
(and unemployment) are described. If the two variables responded to
the needs of these domestic targets, the resulting pattern would be
V-shaped, or at least each line would be in a lower position during
the trough-to-peak phase than during its opposite. In fact, however, no
such patterns emerge.
Neither could it be assumed that the rates of expansion of credit and
of money responded, as a rule, to the needs of price stability. It will be
that prices were practically stable until 1962, when a trend of
price increases appeared. The high rates of expansion of money and
credit since 1962, which may have been the source of the price rise,
definitely cannot be interpreted as having been maintained in response
to the need for price stability.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate the movements of the bud-
getary variables: quarterly data on revenues, expenditures, and the
budgetary balance are available only from 1957. This limitation of the
data not only shortens the period of observation, but also makes it im-
possible to examine reactions of these variables to balance-of-payments
deficits. Evaluation of the available data, as far as they go, does not
reveal any general relationship between the fiscal variables and the
position of the balance of payments. •The budgetary deficit appears
to have been particularly large from about early 1958 to mid-1961.
At the beginning of this period external reserves rose markedly, but
during most of the period they were rather stable. The deficits increased
once more from late 1964 to late 1966, the end of the period covered
by the data—again mostly a time of stable reserves. Thus, there is no
evidence to justify an assumption that movements of the budgetary
deficit corresponded with movements of the balance of payments; nor
do these data indicate a general responsiveness of the budgetary deficit
to the requirements of high production, high employment, or price
stability. It should, however, be emphasized again that any conclusions
about the budgetary variables are very tentative at best, given the lack
of data for the earlier years.92 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
3. Summary and Interpretation
Throughout most of the period, until about 1962, monetary policy and
developments in Belgium appear to have been quite closely and regu-
larly linked with the country's balance-of-payments position. The
following is a typical sequence of events.
Assume a downward imbalance of payments with a decline in the
country's external reserves. Normally the National Bank would react
to this position by raising the discount rate, by far the most important
direct rrionetary instrument. By convention, a rise in interest rates
charged by the commercial banks will follow the increase in the dis-
count rate. This movement of the interest rates is consistent with the
development of credit supply, which may be traced as follows. The
loss of external reserves reduces the reserves of the commercial banks
with the National Bank. 'The commercial banks compensate part of this
reduction by increasing their borrowing from the National Bank, despite
the increase of the discount rate. Yet, at the end of the process, the
commercial banking system does restrict its credit outstanding—that is,
more precisely, it does reduce the rate of credit expansion. The rate of
expansion of the money supply is also reduced, Of the three major
components which create money—namely, the accumulation of foreign
assets, bank credit and National Bank lending to the government—the
first falls, the second falls more often than not, while the last normally
fluctuates without a regular trend, so that it usually does not offset the
movement of the first two, components. As a result, the money supply
moves in the same direction as the external reserves. When a surplus
appears in the balance of payments, and external reserves start rising,
all these processes are normally reversed.
By the Nurkse definition, the "rules of the game" were not obeyed
in Belgium: a loss of foreign assets by the National Bank was almost
consistently accompanied, as has just been mentioned, by a rise in the
Bank's lending to commercial banks, which usually was not offset by a
change in the Bank's lending to the government. The National Bank's
domestic assets thus tended to move in the direction opposite to the
Bank's foreign assets. By the alternative definition suggested in this
study, however, in which movements of the discount rate and of money
supply serve as yardsticks, the "rules of the game" of monetary policyBELGIUM 93
were indeed observed in Belgium more consistently than in most other
countries. Judged by the behavior of these two variables, as well as
credit supply, monetary policy was used regularly in Belgium for the
purpose of balance-of-payments adjustment.
Most of the time the requirements of balance-of-payments adjust-
ment were not in conflict, but rather in agreement, with the demands of
the domestic targets of high employment and high production. A loss
of reserves most often came at a time of fast expansion of production
and low unemployment; that is, when the economy was characterized
by high aggregate demand, although in Belgium during most of the
period studied, this did not also mean rapid price increases. In the same
way, balance-of-payments surpluses coincided as a rule with a slack
in production and with high unemployment. This is a likely concurrence
in a small country, where the effect of domestic policies on the balance-
of-payments is presumably more important than developments in the
world market. The cycle of developments might very well be as follows:
with a balance-of-payments deficit, a restrictive monetary policy is
followed, as indicated above. This leads, in time, to balance-of-pay-
ments surpluses accompanied by a domestic slack resulting from the
contraction of domestic demand. And this, in turn, calls for an expan-
sionary monetary policy, which would lead again to a deficit in the
balance of payments.
During the last few years of the period covered—from about 1962
or 1963—a change in the policy pattern may be apparent. This. is a
period in which reserves accumulated most of the time, although at a
mild pace, while the price level, which had been rather stable before,
started to rise at a relatively fast rate. During these years, the discount
rate appeared to be responsive to the target of price stability, rather
than to the needs of the balance of payments. Yet movements of the
money supply and bank credit still seemed to conform largely to the
position of the balance of payments. It thus may be argued that mone-
tary policy in Belgium in these years also acted partly to restore
balance-of-payments equilibrium. By permitting a fast expansion of
money and credit it allowed prices to increase as they did, which in
turn prevented a still greater accumulation of external reserves. Yet,
these adjusting movements were mitigated by the restrictive act of rais-
ing the discount rate.
Limitations of data—only the latter half of the period is well covered
—restrict the possibility of deriving conclusions about the pattern of
budgetary variables in Belgium. As far as the data go, they show no94 DEMA.ND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
evidence that the budgetary balance was generally responsive to the
balance of. payments. .Neither is there any indication of policy "mix"
by which budgetary policy is assigned the task of serving the domestic
targets of employment and production, while monetary policy is en-
gaged in balance-of-payments adjustment.
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